By Saleem Payenda (4 July 2021)
Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them. This article will examine the main answers that have been given to the following questions. Firstly, how should legitimacy be defined? Is it primarily a descriptive or a normative concept? If legitimacy is understood normatively, what does it entail? Why do the leaders and opponents of the Afghan republic invest more in this concept than anything else? Is political legitimacy based on consensus? Are elections a fundamental path to political legitimacy? Did Afghan governments have, or do they have legitimacy?
The current precarious situation in Afghanistan is more conducive than ever to such questions. Enemies and political opposition of the Islamic Republic say that one million votes couldn’t justify political legitimacy. But the supporters of the Republic consider elections and voting to be the axis of legitimacy and reality of the Afghan state. Doesn’t this indicate that the concept of political legitimacy has no precedent in the propaganda of the republic, nor the propaganda of the political opposition and the Taliban’s Emirate? Were those who did not vote in the presidential election potentially anti-regime? It can be said that the Afghans are not the buyers of the legitimacy-centric argument, and the slogans of both the republic and the emirate give useless maneuver and extension to this concept.
The Question of Political Legitimacy
Legitimacy is the product of political power. Those convicted of power gain legitimacy so that they can free themselves from the clutches of those in power, they want access to resources and to overcome restrictions, and those who seek power to influence political legitimacy want to define the boundaries and areas of their power, authority, and domination. In fact, both the convicts and power-holders influence political legitimacy in order to protect their interests.
Legitimacy could be debatable through three scenarios:
First, the legitimacy through the eye of the legal system demonstrates the extent to which a political system establishes and respects a political relationship within the legal framework of the system.
The second is the judgment of political legitimacy outside the realm of the relationship of political power from the point of view of moral philosophy. For example, the attitude towards the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its concept shows that a political system that respects and stays close to this value, is the higher legitimate and at the same time, the farther away from these international treaties, its legitimacy is diminished.
Third, in the social sciences, legitimacy is often seen as a political experiment.
But what are the factors that give rise to political legitimacy and what do parameters measure the legitimacy? Here, from this discussion, we can deduce two issues:
The value concept of legitimacy presents a normative framework in which a political relation is not organic. For example, it is not possible to measure Nazi Germany on a scale of liberal principles which that is not there. Likewise, where there is democracy, it is useless to analyze the experience of hegemony. Max Weber’s theories have the greatest impact on the empirical concept of legitimacy[1]. The empirical concept is a descriptive state of political legitimacy, showing why people should stand by the system, how effective the leader’s charisma is, and what are these arguments that can be put in mind to make the government and the system attractive?
According to David Hume, if legitimacy is tied to the general consensus, there is a problem, because the general consensus can be used as barter and easy to buy.
To better understand the value and empirical implications, we need to create a broad synthesis of political legitimacy. This means that for the legitimacy of a political system and power, at least three characteristics must be measured:
Afghanistan’s Narratives of Political Legitimacy
As the issue of legitimacy is important in political philosophy, it also plays a vital role in practical politics. The fundamental question is by what logic, reason, and means does a ruler justify his government? For example, what right does President Ghani have to rule over the fate of 33 million Afghans, or what right does the Chinese leader have to rule over more than a billion Chinese? This is the primary question of legitimacy. From international observations and state-building experiences, we can offer a basic and general answer in three phases:
First, what is the degree of success of the government, how capable and efficient it is, to what extent it can enforce the general order, security, and law of the society?
Second, what is the degree of public satisfaction, how much people are satisfied with the performance of the government?
Third, what is the degree of economic well-being, whether there is an improvement in people’s food and occupational security?
Although these are the practical axes of political legitimacy, there are various inspiring narratives for legitimacy in Afghanistan’s contemporary political history:
In the Republic, we face limited and vulnerable political legitimacy. The question with the village, and the city dweller is that what is “our” concern? What is the role of the citizen? And how to deal with this vulnerable and limited legitimacy? The most populist answer is that the Afghans need to act in a double standard given the limited legitimacy of the republic; acknowledge the positives and try to correct the shortcomings. This legitimacy can be assumed to mean that the republic enjoys strong legitimacy in some areas and is backed by a particular social stratum. But in some other areas, it has weak legitimacy, such as the system of governance and the ability of the State apparatus to be questioned.
The Cost of Political Legitimacy in Afghanistan
That is the fear of risk. We need to look deeper into why both sides are investing so much in political legitimacy. The real issue, called the cost of legitimacy, is the precarious state of government, although, amidst turmoil, war, and unexpected changes, every government is shaky and vulnerable. As a result, the fear of survival comes at cost of legitimacy.
Governments around the world that emerged from wars were shaken. The post-revolutionary government in France, the newly formed governments of China and Russia, had a high probability of collapse and risk of extinction. It was a growing threat to them then as it is now to us. As far as the survival of the system is concerned, maintaining the integrity of the system is the key problem, not the components and institutes. Whenever there is talk of the legitimacy of the system, we say whether the totality is legitimate or not, because legitimacy is debatable on the totality of the system.
The Republic must function together because the issue for the “Emirate” is the totality of the system, not units, such as Wolesi Jirga, the Elections Commission, and others.
Max Weber introduced three descriptive sources for political legitimacy [3], that can be well seen in a country like Afghanistan:
Looking at the above divisions, we see that in some parts of Afghanistan, traditional sources, in some other parts, charismatic sources, and modern structures have been rooted in large cities.
The great challenge of the Republic is that it is equally difficult to bring these diverse sources under one umbrella [5]. It is a major challenge for Afghanistan to modernize traditional sources and restore them as a potential for legitimacy. An example of a charismatic source is Hamid Karzai, who has had several backtracking followers since his inauguration and claimed legitimacy based on his character. In both terms of President Ghani, there is a fierce rivalry between the two groups.
The Republic has numerous modern and traditional sources. Most valuable is the blood of the Afghan Army, and a series of achievements, such as the elections, institutes, state-building efforts, free press, education, women’s participation, which is, in fact, a representation of a century of struggles. The 45,000 Afghan soldiers who died in the last 20 years, is the primary reason for the survival of the system. The blood of the ANA, ANP, and NDS have been the price of the political legitimacy of the Republic. The armed forces have families and form a large community whose interaction is a fundamental reason for the republic’s political legitimacy.
Another tool is elections, sometimes used as a mechanism to generate legitimacy and sometimes as a custodian of legitimacy and to revive the current system [6]. Elections are a key principle in Afghanistan’s 20-year history. It both increases and decreases the legitimacy. Our generation defines legitimacy on the basis of elections, which have been held in this country, and the hypothesis of forming a government has been formulated on that basis. In the election, both the government and the nation turned to a deal, a compromise, and a concession. One side gave an advantage; the other side took advantage. The government facilitated the elections by offering a variety of programs to the people, with the promise of security and economic development. The Afghan nation knew that the elections were not 100% free and fair and that their role in the elections could only be a show. But they still participated in it and gave the government privilege of legitimacy. It was a contract that could be called a social contract, but the fact that it offers a package of responsibilities and obligations, and the case of Afghanistan is so complex that sometimes there is much more to the question of legitimacy than elections.
Security and Political Legitimacy
Security is a vital factor in the relationship of legitimacy, part of the social contract between the nation and the state. The American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset offers a very simple approach: “An easy practical way to measure legitimacy is to look at what people say if people appreciate the government, it has legitimacy, and vice versa the legitimacy is in question”.
Legitimacy is not a moral contract. What nationalists, leftists, religious people say are all veils. First, they gain power by force, coup, revolution, and various other means, and then they paint a moral ecstasy.
According to Professor Lipset, any system that is stable and people have no incentive to change the government style is legitimate. Whenever the government provides public security, its legitimacy increases. The measure of legitimacy does not have a single ethical philosophy, but rather the degree of security is a tool for measuring legitimacy.
Historically, Afghan governments can be considered illegitimate in terms of the above criteria, with casualties’ rates directly linked to legitimacy, but security here is not the only goal of life and death. Conditions of women, children, and youth, human rights, employment, education, infrastructure, and their economic stability are important security factors.
According to this definition, both the Taliban’s emirate narrative and the republic are deprived of legitimacy because the social, economic, physical, intellectual, and mental securities of the people are not secure in both realms.
In Hobbes’ influential account, political legitimacy is created by the social contract. In the state of nature, everyone’s self-preservation is under threat, and this makes it rational for all, Hobbes argues, to consent to a covenant that authorizes a sovereign who can guarantee their protection and to transfer their rights to this sovereign—an individual or a group of individuals. When there is no such sovereign, one may be created by a covenant—Hobbes calls this “sovereignty by institution”. But political authority may also be established by the promise of all to obey a threatening power (“sovereignty by acquisition”).
Both manners of creating a sovereign are equally legitimate. And political authority will be legitimate as long as the sovereign ensures the protection of the citizens, as Hobbes believes that the natural right to self-preservation cannot be relinquished. Beyond that, however, there can be no further questions about the legitimacy of the sovereign. There is no distinction between effective authority and legitimate authority in Hobbes’ thought. It might even be argued that Hobbes fails to distinguish between legitimate authority and the mere exercise of power.
Whatever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, then what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Conclusion and a New Dialogue
In addition to the above explanations, other groups of newly trained political potentials, whose voices or positions are not nurtured in the system, appear as an anti-system, and question the political legitimacy of the country. They are educated people, former and current members of the Karzai and Dr. Ghani governments. Even some of them are external non-state actors who are also supported by foreign regional agencies and are trying to reach the forefront of the government after a possible political agreement in the future.
This group is fed by the silence of the enlightened forces. They are sometimes named the “Necktie Posh Taliban“, meaning the Taliban who wear Western-style fabrics. They try to define and challenge the legitimacy of the system as a whole rather than the actions of a state institution or position while the legitimacy of that organ and individual must be questioned.
Can ordinary Afghan citizens watching television in Lashkar Gah, Aibak, Kabul, and Charikar and witnessing the beheading, explosion, or destruction of schools, bridges, or roads by Taliban, Haqqani network, or ISIS within a few kilometers feel safe? Can the government still get the general consent of the people? Is a consensus even possible?
Robert Dahl wrote, “Legitimacy cannot be tied to general consensus. Political consent is also important” [7]. Has this consent been obtained? Is the State apparatus safe from administrative and economic corruption? Are the underprivileged sections of society involved?
In addition to the importance of internal factors for legitimacy, the external environment is also a significant factor to consider. When we compare the condition of foreign States with our own, if their condition is better than ours, then our legitimacy may be called into question.
(Saleem Payenda is a post-graduate student in the School of International Politics and Diplomacy, University of Mysore, India. He writes on Diplomatic history, foreign policy, and State-building efforts in Afghanistan. Views expressed are personal.)
References:
[1] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947; p. 103.
[2] Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1–2 (March–June 2006): P. 24–26.
[3] Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1992). The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays. University of Chicago Press, p. 46.
[4] Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981). “One the Source of Authority of the State,” Ethics, Religion, and Politics (Collected Philosophical Papers: Volume 3), Oxford: Blackwell, Pp. 139–155.
[5] Articles 60 and 61 in Chapter Three of the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution govern the Presidency and Presidential elections. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan (2004). URL: http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf
[6] Ibid.
[7] Dahl, Robert A. (1956). A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago: Chicago University Press. P. 78
