Samiullah Doorandesh (19 October 2019)
The continuity of blame game, taming militants and
terrorists, prevalence of mistrust, diminishing economic dependency, armed
clashes at the borders, interference in internal affairs, and pursuit of
stringent policies have not and would not help any. Pakistan and Afghanistan
desperately need to identify the past blunders, modify their dealings and
introduce drastic changes in the interstate modus operandi.
Despite numerous commonalities—religious, cultural, lingual and societal, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have had a conflicting and problematic bilateral journey from the beginning, largely owing to the unjust, faulty and unpragmatic policies and bitter legacy of the British colonialism.
The British colonialists withdrew from South Asia in hurry, leaving incomplete propositions, most significantly the Durand Line. The repudiation of the treaties of Britain Empire by the Afghan Loya Jirga, the traditional Grand Assembly of community elders, cemented the uneasy foundation for future bilateral dealings, each state supporting the nationalist and destabilizing armed expatriated movements to depose unwanted governments and to secure their interests. Tribal incursions and supporting the expatriated armed insurgents along armed conflicts at the border became the norm.
The soviet invasion and commencement of the Mujahideen insurgency to force the godless out of their homeland turned the tables in favour of Pakistan, though at the cost of the Afghan refugees. Kalashnikov culture and illegal trade had drastically impacted its economy, and had debilitating effects upon the Pakistani society.
Furthermore, the socio-politico changes of 1990s, the absence of central authority and crumbling of national army in Afghanistan brought the T into power with support from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), fulfilling the long held dream of Pakistan’s strategy makers, the Policy of Strategic Depth.
The situations did not unfold as planned by the Pakistani government though as after the fateful 9/11 attack, Pakistan was coerced into supporting the United States ‘war on terror’. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ and arrival of U.S. into the South Asian theatre, disturbed the calculations and designs framed by the Pakistani foreign policy makers and military strategists.
Pakistan, adjusting to the ever-changing environment, and though it provided the US all logistic support, it embraced on dualistic policy and simultaneously provided safe heavens to deposed T leaders, including al-Qaeda chief Osama bin-Laden. Pakistan offered them every kind of sanctuaries, logistics and expertise of strategic military operational planning to wear down the world’s mightiest military in their backyard, consequently agitating the respective Afghan governments.
The current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imam Khan was forthright when he recently accepted during a talk at the US based think-tank Pakistan’s “biggest blunders”. Speaking at the Council for Foreign Relations, he said, “I said we had first trained these guys to fight jihad and it was a great idea, and now we are telling the same groups it’s terrorism. So we should at least have stayed neutral. Pakistan, by joining the US after 9/11, committed one of the biggest blunders.”
Since the ‘war on terror’, the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been cordial, and the mistrust between the two countries are at the lowest ebb. The lack of effective regulating mechanisms, blame game of harbouring the agents of terror and chaos, and occasional outburst of violent clashes at the borders continue to undermine the relations.
Islamabad is also not comfortable with what it sees as the growing influence of India – the archrival of Pakistan – in contrast to growing anger against Pakistan’s government.
Both brethren countries have various opportunities which, if dealt with honesty and strong intent, will drastically improve the troubled relations. There are undeniable realities which must be admitted, and historical blunders that must not to be repeated if there is a positive intention of curing strained relations.
The prime factor, which should be worked upon to realize this goal, is the existence of safe heavens and sanctuaries for T insurgents in Pakistan, which are fundamental and decisive in protracted guerilla warfare against the Afghan government. Pakistan needs to dismantle the T command structures on its soil and satiate the apprehensions of Afghan leadership about the rhetorically discarded Strategic Depth policy.
In return, Afghanistan will have to bargain, sooner or later, on the formal recognition of the disputed Durand Line. Such a bargain can only be feasible if permanent unhindered transit access to sea routes is given, to landlocked Afghanistan, for trade motives. Furthermore, the malevolent Afghan public opinion, towards Pakistan, can only be redressed with an end to the civilian carnage by T insurgents. The fact can’t be ignored that with every suicide bomb explosion, public eyebrows are directed towards the eastern neighbour.
The solution to the Afghan crisis rests only in political settlement, especially negotiating with T to become stakeholders in political process and Pakistan can be of huge help in this process. Pakistan can win the hearts and minds of millions of Afghans. Pakistan’s honest commitment can boost, reshape its perception in public eyes as well as in global community. In addition, Afghanistan must redress the Pakistani concerns and make sure her soil is not used by non-state actors against Pakistan.
Trade and economic interdependencies make states refrain from going into conflicts. The stringent border policies and frequent closure of borders have compelled the Afghan traders and importers to explore new markets. Pakistan was the most exporting, nearest and cheapest market to Afghanistan, though such hindrances have allowed Iran to take the lead.
According a media report in April 2019, the trade volume between Afghanistan and Pakistan, having a potential of $5.5 billion, has plummeted from $3.5 billion to $1.7 billion. It might spiral downward to a meager amount if the current bitterness in bilateral relations continues.
Pakistan can positively manage millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. Some solutions could be: the permanent integration of new generations who want to settle in Pakistan, or a respected withdrawal that can boost Pakistan’s reputation. The new generations, born in Pakistan and not having been to their home land think of Pakistan literally as their own motherland. Pakistan can also contribute in Afghanistan’s infrastructure building; the way India has been doing by constructing hydro-electric dams, building parliament, providing defense equipment and constructing homes for repatriating refugees.
Pakistan can contest the Indian influence in their backyard by continuing to cooperate in the infrastructure sector. The recent inauguration of Muhammad Ali Jinnah Hospital in Kabul is promising, notwithstanding the asymmetry in economic prowess with rival India.
Moreover, enhanced Track Ⅱ diplomatic initiatives are vital for shaping perception. Pakistan should continue the scholarship endowments to Afghan students in the fields of science, technology, medicine and business. Students, having studied in renowned Pakistani universities will return as ambassadors for peace, prosperity and fraternity. Last but not the least; we need to promote easy movement without stringent policies and discouraging hurdles. Both states can learn, in this regard, from EU, Schengen and Gulf countries.
The recent transformation in Pakistani policy shift in regard to Afghanistan is something one can hope for better direction of bilateral ties. The Pakistani commitment in pressuring T leadership to reach a settlement on the political front; and the realization of investment in infrastructural and developmental projects, even if they are not precisely megaprojects, are vital to win the hearts and minds of Afghan populace as a way towards realization of cordial bilateral ties.
Breaking the
deadlock is easy, if only Pakistan is serious about having cordial, friendly
relations with its western neighbour and does not see Afghanistan merely
through the prism of Strategic Depth.
(Samiullah Doorandesh is an Afghan refugee, pursuing an undergraduate degree in the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Views expressed are personal.)
